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How the quality of democracy deteriorates: Populism and the 
backsliding of democracy in three West Balkan countries  
 
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos 
Abstract 
Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule 
of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequate-
ly explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy de-
creases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they 
ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to 
form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are back-
pedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated demo-
cratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic 
in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in 
Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Alt-
hough not present in all backsliding democracies, populism, clientelism 
and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated 
democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy.  
 
Keywords: populism, clientelism, corruption, quality of democracy, Western 
Balkans 
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I. Introduction 
Αfter the victories and near-victories of populist or nationalist political 
parties and candidates in elections which took place in 2012-2016 in 
Hungary, Poland, Austria, and the USA, the academic literature on 
quality of democracy, which is more than ten years old (Morlino 
2004, Diamond and Morlino 2005, Buehlman, Merkel and Wessels 
2007) has become very topical. In the meantime, efforts to evaluate 
democracy and to determine whether democracy is on the decline 
have multiplied (e.g., Lindberg 2011, Foa and Munk 2016).  All these 
strands of academic literature depart from the premise that democracy 
cannot anymore be viewed as a mere procedure to periodically elect 
governing equippes. Nor is it acceptable that such equippes will tend 
to the affairs of the state unencumbered by concerns such as accounta-
bility and political participation in decision-making. This traditional, 
minimal understanding of democracy as a procedure to periodically 
elect those who govern (Schumpeter 1976) is less and less sustainable 
in today’s world, when democracy leaves a lot to be desired. 
In this context, the quality of democracy as a concept is discussed in 
systemic terms and as a variable characterizing a political regime, 
namely contemporary liberal democracy. The quality of democracy is 
a not value-neutral concept. It refers to approximating a good democ-
racy in terms of a) procedures of decision-making (rule of law, effi-
ciency), b) the content of decisions and policies (freedom, equality) 
and c) the output of democracy, measured by legitimation of specific 
institutions and/or policies (Morlino 2004). 
As a variable, the quality of democracy may be high or low. It is obvi-
ously a variable difficult to measure, which rather ambitiously at-
tempts to catch various dimensions of the workings of a democratic 
regime: freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, responsive-
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ness, equality, participation, competition, and horizontal accountabil-
ity (Diamond and Morlino 2005). 
Whether the quality of democracy is estimated to be higher or lower, 
depends on numerous factors, including contextual ones, namely as-
pects of the specific democracy under study. It is a concept which is 
operationalized in more than one ways. It is assessed through qualita-
tive analysis, for example, through case studies of the extent to which 
the rule of law is implemented in various countries (O’Donnel 2004, 
Magen and Morlino 2008) and also through the compilation of quanti-
tative data, in the form of numerical values assigned to indicators of 
the level of quality of democracy. Such indicators are employed by the 
Freedom House, the Polity Project, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Fund 
for Peace, the World Bank’s “World Governance Indicators” and the 
“Varieties of Democracy” projects to assess contemporary democra-
cies.   
Other literature has focused on the illiberal turn of democracy or the 
back-sliding or back-pedaling of democracy or the disruption of de-
mocracy, all of which are phenomena indicating that there is deteriora-
tion of quality of democracy (Zakaria 1997, Tilly 2003, Bohle and 
Greskovits 2009, Krastev 2014, Bermeo 2016). But how and through 
what mechanisms does the quality of democracy deteriorate? This is 
the main question of this paper, which, however, is discussed in the 
context of a specific region, the Western Balkans (WBs). 
In what follows, a brief presentation of the phenomenon of backslid-
ing of democracy in the contemporary world will be made. It will be 
followed by a discussion of populist challenges to democracy. Then, 
the analysis will proceed to the theoretical framework of the paper, 
case selection and research design. In the main body of the paper, evi-
dence on the backsliding of democracy is presented and alternative 
approaches to evaluating democracies are assessed. The bending of 
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rules of the democratic game is interpreted in a wider socio-economic 
context, and specific patterns of populism, clientelism and corruption 
are analysed as three distinct, but also variably combined, means of 
political domination of governing elites in West Balkan (WB) democ-
racies. Although the paper’s focus is on three WB countries, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, evidence from other WB coun-
tries is also furnished. The paper ends with a discussion of how popu-
lism, clientelism and corruption feed into each other, eventually pro-
voking the degradation of democracy’s quality. 
The backsliding of democracy 
About a quarter of a century after the third wave of democratization 
reached its peak with the almost simultaneous transition to democracy 
in almost all East European countries (1989-1991), a discussion about 
grave problems threatening democracy has resurfaced with an intensi-
ty encountered probably only in the democracies of the inter-war peri-
od (1918-1939). This time the limits to democracy and the weakness 
of democratic institutions in the face of major challenges  have be-
come visible in several ways: first, in the problematic way in which 
the recent economic crisis was managed by governments and interna-
tional actors in the weakest economies of Europe; second, in the deep-
ening of income inequalities in a liberal democratic setting; and, third, 
in the ascent to government, through national elections, of popu-
list/nationalist political parties and leaders who tamper with the con-
stitution, electoral systems, and the media, among other democratic 
institutions.   
The emergence and survival, if not the multiplication of such govern-
ments, pose at least three larger theoretical questions about the quality 
of democracy. First, given the above context, is political responsibility 
actually implemented? Second, what is the interaction between citi-
zens and decision-makers? And, third, are citizens able to make politi-
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cal authorities accountable? Naturally these questions concern, not 
only relatively recently established, but all representative democracies 
today, including the oldest and most stable among them, such as 
France (according to LIEPP’s research axis “evaluation of democra-
cy”; see http://www.sciencespo.fr/liepp/fr/content/axe-evaluation-de-
la-democratie-evaldem).  
However, such questions may also be investigated in recently estab-
lished, albeit not fully consolidated democracies, where memories and 
possibilities of non-democratic rule are still available. Moreover, these 
questions may acquire particular relevance in contexts where democ-
racy is younger, such as, for instance, in the post-socialist democracies 
of WBs. In these cases, despite disappointments of citizens with de-
mocracy, there is still debate on what one may expect from a fuller 
consolidation of democracy and from joining the world of longer es-
tablished democracies, such as the democracies of Member-States of 
the European Union (EU).   
Indeed, the study of transitions to and consolidation of democracy has 
shown that democratization is not a linear process. Rather, it must be 
understood as an open-ended process, which is debated within and 
among political elites and publics and driven by multiple institutional 
pressures and actors’ choices (Linz and Stepan 1996, Whitehead 
2002). Further on, research has shifted from problems of democratic 
consolidation to the study of democratic persistence and the quality of 
democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005, Roberts 2009).  
Since the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe (1989-1991), the 
general impression has been that liberal democracy as a type of politi-
cal regime has been diffused around the world and –barring cases of 
civil strife or other major domestic tensions - it is not under threat. 
However, there is increasing concern about a ten-year long “decline in 
global freedom” (Freedom House 2016, for the period since 2006), 
2017/06 
6 
“democratic recession” (Diamond 2015), and longer declining trends 
in citizens’ attachment to democracy (Foa and Munck 2016). 
Other studies on democracy over the past ten years have pointed to 
possibilities of de-democratization (Tilly 2007) and processes of 
“state-led debilitation or even elimination of the political institutions 
sustaining an existing democracy”, aptly called “democratic backslid-
ing” (Bermeo 2016).   
Long-term, explicitly anti-democratic regimes of the kind experienced 
in developed and developing societies in the previous century have 
dwindled. Backsliding occurs through brief coups followed by a 
promise to return to democracy, by manipulation of electoral systems 
and infringement of regulations on elections and by the further en-
hancement of the powers of the executive over the rest of the branches 
of government (Bermeo 2016).  
The populist challenge to democracy 
However, the exact mechanisms through which actors, such as elected 
governments, may today make a democracy backslide, short of engi-
neering a complete breakdown of democracy, deserve a closer look. 
This is all the more so, as liberal democracies, even in the heart of 
Europe where modern democracy has originated, now face uncommon 
challenges from the left and the right of the political spectrum, in the 
form of the rise of populism. Indeed, the advent of populist parties to 
power in Hungary and Poland, the formation of coalition governments 
based on pre-electoral radical populist discourse in Greece and the 
meteoric electoral performance of populist candidates in other Euro-
pean democracies and the USA have raised questions about the origins 
and nature of populism and possible challenges to liberal democracy. 
Such challenges do not only come from “below”, but also from 
“above”, i.e., from winners of elections who tamper with democratic 
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institutions after they obtain a parliamentary confidence vote and are 
sworn in.  
Admittedly, populists may be supportive of democratic institutions, at 
least before they rise to government, and in fact they may express the 
interests of popular strata, such as low-income groups. In that sense, 
depending on the historical period in question and the structure of the 
political party system, populist parties may contribute to the enlarge-
ment of political participation and the furthering of democratization. 
Yet, comparative political research in Europe has not analysed how 
such populist parties and leaders behave, once they are elected to 
power, to an extent equal to that it has done in explaining the dis-
course and attractiveness of populism (Mudde 2007, Kriesi 2014, 
Kriesi and Pappas 2016). Indeed, European populism thrives on cer-
tain distinct themes and mentalities, which includes adherence to the 
nation (Taguieff 2007) and hostility to domestic and foreign alleged 
enemies of the people. The latter include business elites and particu-
larly bankers, foreign trade, the European Union (EU) authorities, the 
Muslim and Jewish religions, migrants and refugees, gender- and sex-
ual-identity movements. Not all these themes are found in all populist 
discourses. For instance, left-wing populists are not necessarily na-
tionalists and at least nominally support refugees and migrants.  
Populists may be hostile to some or all the above groups and authori-
ties in order to attract the votes of citizens who seek familiar scape-
goats for domestic economic and social ills or are alienated from su-
pra-national authorities, currents and processes. Once in power, popu-
lists share a propensity to govern in an unbounded fashion. In other 
words, they rule without taking into account political and administra-
tive institutions other than the government itself. They actually take 
such institutions, such as the justice system or the media, into account 
in so far as they can undermine or neutralize them.  
2017/06 
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What is the relationship of democracy and populism in power? This 
paper will argue the relationship is very tense, if not incompatible, and 
that it is better to understand populism as one among different means 
of political domination in recently established democracies.  Other 
such means of political domination are clientelism and corruption. For 
reasons to be explained in the paper’s next sections, likely candidates, 
amenable to the study of low quality of democracy and democratic 
backsliding, are democracies of the Western Balkans.   
In view of the above, a tentative answer to this paper’s main question, 
namely how and through what mechanisms the deterioration of quality 
of democracy takes place, is the following: under lingering state so-
cialist legacies, the combination of strong governments with fragile 
parliamentary opposition and weak civil society result in the backslid-
ing of democracy. This is accomplished through the governments’ 
drawing on a repertoire of populist, clientelist and corruption practic-
es, as this paper will argue with regard to today’s WBs.  The result of 
employing populism, clientelism, and corruption as three different and 
often combined means of political domination is that the quality of 
democracy decreases and democracy itself backslides from the level 
of consolidation or near-consolidation it has reached.   
II. Theoretical framework of the paper and the consolidation 
of democracy in the Western Balkans (WBs) 
There is no consensus whether most WB democratic regimes have 
been consolidated or not. On the one hand, multiple parliamentary and 
presidential elections have taken place since transition to democracy, 
there has been government turnover, and there are no visible players, 
such as the army or the security forces or other institutional or extra-
institutional powers, which doubt that democracy is the only game in 
town (Linz and Stepan 1996).  
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On the other hand, WB regimes function in ways which lead analysts 
to question how democratic they are. For example, Freedom House 
considers Albania and all former Yugoslav democracies, with the ex-
ception of Slovenia, as “semi-consolidated democratic” or “transition-
al government/hybrid” regimes (Freedom House 2016). The former 
term means “electoral democracies that meet relatively high standards 
for the selection of national leaders but exhibit some weaknesses in 
their defense of political rights and civil liberties”. The latter term 
(“transitional/hybrid regimes”) means “electoral democracies that 
meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. 
Democratic institutions are fragile and substantial challenges to the 
protection of political rights and civil liberties exist, while the poten-
tial for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear” (Freedom House 
2016). The aforementioned countries are similarly assessed in other 
counts, such as the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2015).  
On the same issue, in more qualitative assessments of democracy in 
the same region, there are usually two lines of argument. A first line 
of argument claims that WB regimes are not democratic at all. They 
are oligarchic regimes functioning to the benefit of small, closely knit 
political and business elites (Horvat and Stiks 2015).  
A second line of argument claims that, while most of the appropriate 
institutions found in liberal democracies are in place, in the Western 
Balkans (WBs) such institutions do not function according to the 
standards required by contemporary advanced democracies. Analysts 
periodically point to voids in the relevant legislation of WB states and 
underline policy implementation gaps. For instance, such observations 
are regularly contained in European Commission’s annual “Progress 
Reports”. This line of argument prioritizes the rule of law in the sense 
that it considers the problem with WB democracies to be a problem of 
limitations of the formal institutional design and un-satisfactory im-
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plementation of the legal framework governing these democracies 
(Dolenec 2013). 
The first line of argument mentioned above, i.e., the radical approach, 
is problematic because it either assumes that the structures of capital-
ism, conceived in an anthropomorphic manner, unavoidably restrict 
democracy or it borders on conspiracy theory. A further problem is 
that even if this line of argument sheds its structuralist or conspiratori-
al overtones, it still assumes that elites are all-powerful and act in an 
institutional void. 
The problem with the second line of argument, i.e., the rule-of-law 
approach, which correctly underlines the inadequacy of the legal 
framework and the implementation gap in the WBs, is different. This 
approach implicitly assumes that if you change the institutions, human 
behaviour will change accordingly. More concretely if rule of law is 
finally achieved in WBs, the remaining problems of democracy will 
gradually be more or less resolved. This is a rather optimistic view 
that possibly underplays the significance of aggravating historical leg-
acies in the WBs. 
Having in mind that there is a wider crisis of liberal democracy un-
folding in different quarters of the advanced and the developing 
world, this paper accepts that historical legacies shape institutions. 
The pathways which the latter follow, are dependent on choices ini-
tially made at the initial time point of their conception (Steinmo, The-
len and Longstreth 1992).  
The paper does not assume that everything is pre-determined by his-
torical legacies, but attempts to map how powerful actors, such as po-
litical and business elites partially bend institutions. They put institu-
tions to uses suitable to their own interests, for instance by misusing 
democratic institutions. This is a wider point, not limited only to the 
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case of democracies in WBs. Indeed, starting from different analytical 
frameworks, analysts have underlined the problems of today’s liberal 
democracies and have criticized the functioning of democratic institu-
tions in general (Crouch 2004, Della Porta 2013).  
In the context noted above, this paper argues two things: first, that 
democracies in WB are not competitive authoritarian regimes (Levit-
sky and Way 2010) but currently share some of the problems which 
many contemporary advanced democracies face, although admittedly 
some of these problems occur in WBs to a larger extent. 
And, second, that, in contrast to most advanced democracies, democ-
racy in WBs has been put to self-serving uses by specific concrete 
collective actors. The latter employ populism, clientelism and corrup-
tion to prolong existing power asymmetries which benefit them. 
Typical examples of such actors are groups of insiders (individual 
businessmen, business trusts and privileged groups of the workforce, 
linked to the public sector and relatively shielded from economic 
hardship) and, above all, skilled, experienced and unscrupulous gov-
erning elites, consisting of cadres of political parties who have been 
active since the 1990s. Such elites emerged after the transition to de-
mocracy and were socialized into and contributed to the undemocratic 
politics of the immediate post-transition period.  
In this paper, we will focus on three such cases, namely, the VMRO-
DMPNE governing elite in FYR Macedonia (in power since 2006), 
the SNS elite in Serbia (in power since 2012) and the DPS elite in 
Montenegro (in power since 1991, the longest surviving post-socialist 
governing elite in Southeastern and Eastern Europe). These elites, 
naturally aiming to rise to power and prolong their stay in power, have 
purposefully helped constructing an institutional environment condu-
cive to their interests. Along the way, they have actively make democ-
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racy backslide, because it is in their interest to do so, while for some 
time now they have been unhindered by domestic and external imped-
iments.   
III. Research design and case selection1 
In comparative historical analysis it is possible to employ several re-
search strategies, two of which stand out. First, one may examine sim-
ilar cases which present a common outcome and attempt to detect a set 
of common factors which lead to the outcome under study in the se-
lected cases (most similar systems research design, owed to John Stu-
art Mill’s original “method agreement”). Alternatively, one may ex-
amine cases which are obviously very different from each other, ex-
cept in one detectable factor which they hold in common and which 
can be shown to be causally associated with the common outcome 
found in all cases under study (most dissimilar systems research de-
sign, owed to John Stuart Mill’s original “method of disagreement”).  
This paper has selected the first research strategy, i.e., most similar 
cases.  
In the 1990s, the regime of liberal democracy, was ushered in the re-
gion of Western Balkans, for example in FYR Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, which at the time along with Serbia, were constituent 
republics of post-socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
simultaneously with transition to the market economy and the redraw-
ing of national frontiers. Democracy did not become consolidated but 
only in a two-step process (Pridham and Gallagher 2000). The three 
countries under study in this paper are examples of such delayed dem-
ocratic consolidation.  
The claim that FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro are consoli-
                                                 
1 I owe the motivation to improve on this section to Emiliano Grossman, Paris, Oc-
tober 2016. 
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dated democracies can of course be disputed. If they are not, then the 
meaning of backsliding of democracy loses part of its value. One 
could argue that democracy cannot backslide from a state of affairs 
which is barely democratic to start with.  However, it can be argued 
that in all three countries, democracy, albeit frail or very far from ide-
al, is actually consolidated.  
First, there has been a double government turnover, i.e., the national 
government has changed hands at least twice in FYR Macedonia and 
Serbia. In Montenegro, it has not done so, but over time there have 
been different governing coalition partners of the ruling party of Milos 
Djukanovic. As the cases of post-war Italy and Japan have shown, in 
dominant party systems the ruling party is not easily defeated in elec-
tions. Electoral dominance in and by itself does not imply lack of 
democratic consolidation. Otherwise Italy and Japan, where the Chris-
tian Democratic party and the Liberal Democratic Party, respectively, 
won successive elections in the post-war period, would not have been 
included among the liberal democracies. 
Second, there is no evidence that citizens of FYR Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro and the political parties participating in electoral con-
tests in the three countries would prefer another political regime over 
democracy. Despite low levels of trust towards democratic institutions 
in the three countries (Regional Cooperation Council - Balkan Barom-
eter 2015: 82-91), it would be unrealistic to claim that Macedonians, 
Serbs and Montenegrins would welcome back a regime of the type 
they left behind a quarter of a century ago. Nostalgia of state social-
ism, which can be widespread in other countries of Eastern Europe, is 
not present in the countries under study. As for “Yugonostalgia”, this 
is more of a cultural than a political trend.  
More concretely, for Serbs and Montenegrins the transition from state 
socialism in 1989-1991 was the first step in a two-step democratiza-
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tion process which did not progress until a second step was taken with 
the defeat of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo war of 1999 and the fall of 
Milosevic from power in 2000. FYR Macedonia also went through a 
similar, two-step process.  It did not itself participate in the Yugoslav 
wars, but was ravaged by internal ethnic strife in the 1990s and was at 
the receiving end of the humanitarian crisis provoked by the Kosovo 
war of 1999. FYR Macedonia thus took the second step in 2001, when 
the Ohrid Agreement partially normalized Macedonian-Albanian rela-
tions within the country.  
In other words, these three countries, Serbia, Montenegro and FYR 
Macedonia originated in the former Yugoslavia, were affected by war 
or strife (Serbia much more than the other two countries), and became 
democratic in a belated fashion. The three countries share a rather 
similar profile, lie in the same region and draw on the same historical 
past after 1945.  
For a quarter of a century now FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Ser-
bia have navigated a course which has brought them to the unchar-
tered waters of a consolidated but substandard democratic regime.  
Today none of the three cases under study can be characterized as a 
semi-authoritarian regime or an “electocracy” (Dawisha and Parrot 
1997), of the kind found in post-Yugoslav states in the 1990s.   
FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia may have originated in for-
mer Yugoslavia and may still today be sharing many similarities, but 
are obviously different in many respects. Examples of such differ-
ences are population size, relevant weight of minorities in their ethnic 
composition, structure of the economy and the labour market, eco-
nomic performance, and the aforementioned degree of participation in 
the Yugoslav wars, among other aspects. Yet, the three countries share 
many characteristics with regard to democratic backsliding, the de-
pendent variable of this research. This is what makes them appropriate 
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for a “most similar systems” research design, employed in the present 
paper.  
The purpose of this design is to find one or more, not always obvious, 
but real similarities among different cases. Such similarities might 
help explain the common phenomenon which these cases share, name-
ly, de-democratisation or the backsliding of democracy which does 
not however end with the complete destruction of democracy, as it 
would happen in the case of a typical nineteenth or twentieth century 
“coup d’état” abolishing a democratic regime.    
IV. Evidence that democracy backslides in the Western Bal-
kans  
There are two ways in which one can investigate whether democracy 
backslides or not. One is to resort to cross-national assessments of 
democratic performance, three of which are mentioned below. The 
other is to focus on particular case studies, unravelling the concrete 
ways in which democracy functions, an exercise attempted in the next 
section of the paper. Table 1, drawn on Freedom House (FH) Index, 
shows scores of democratic freedom (the higher the score, the less free 
the state). 
It must be of course noted that the scores shown in Table 1 are as-
signed by informed experts and academics and are not necessarily 
precise estimations of levels of freedom, let alone democracy in gen-
eral. Nevertheless, they do show a general trend, i.e., a trend towards 
less freedom in the democracies included in Table 1. A similar pattern 
emerges if one looks at trends of perceived corruption. In theory, in a 
country undergoing democratization, transparency is not expected to 
deteriorate over time. Yet, as Table 2 indicates, corruption has in-
creased in the WB countries over time (the higher the score, the less 
transparent a country is perceived to be). 
2017/06 
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Table 1. Democracy in the Western Balkans - Freedom House’s 
index of democracy 
  2011 2013 2015 change 2015-2011 
FYR Macedonia 3.82 3.93 4.07 +0.25 
Montenegro 3.82 3.82 3.89 +0.07 
Serbia 3.64 3.64 3.68 +0.04 
Kosovo 5.18 5.25 5.14 -0.04 
Croatia 3.64 3.61 3.68 +0.04 
Bosnia-Herzegov. 4.32 4.39 4.46 +0.14 
Albania 4.04 4.25 4.14 +0.14 
ECE average 2.29 2.33 2.43 +0.14 
(Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
Source: Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2016, accessed on 03.12.2016 
 
Table 2. Perceived corruption in Western Balkans, 2009 and 2015 
  2009 2015 change 2009-2015 
Kosovo 28 33 +5 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 30 38 +8 
Serbia 35 40 +5 
Croatia 41 51 +10 
Albania 32 36 +4 
FYR Macedonia 38 42 +4 
Montenegro 39 44 +5 
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/, accessed on 02.12.2016 
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According to a third independent assessment, Bertelsmann Stiftung’ 
Transformation Index (BTI), political participation, instead of becom-
ing wider, has decreased over time in most West Balkan countries 
(Table 3). As a concept, political participation in the context of the 
BTI, includes free and fair elections, effective power to govern, asso-
ciation and assembly rights, and freedom of expression.  
Table 3. Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Levels of Political Participation in 
East Central and South East Europe, Bertelsmann Transfor-
mation Index (BTI), 2008-2016 
 2008 2014 2016 
Albania 8.3 7.0 7.2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 8.5 7.5 7.0 
Croatia 9.5 8.8 8.8 
FYR Macedonia 8.8 7.3 6.2 
Kosovo 8.3 7.3 7.2 
Montenegro 8.5 8.0 7.8 
Serbia 8.8 8.3 8.5 
    
Bulgaria 9.3 8.5 8.5 
Romania 9.3 8.3 8.3 
    
Czech Republic 
 
10.0 10.0 9.8 
Hungary 10.0 8.8 7.5 
Poland 9.5 9.8 10.0 
Slovakia 10.0 9.8 9.8 
Slovenia 9.8 9.8 9.5 
Source: BTI data base of the Bertelsmann Stiftung, http://www.bti-
pro-
ject.org/en/suchergebnisseite/?tx_rsmsearch_pi1%5BsearchQuery%5D%5BqueryStr
ing%5D=Time+Series+Political+Participation, accessed on 13.10.2016. Scale 1.0 
10.0; the higher the value, the better the level of political participation. 
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These three tables indicate that democracy is on the process of back-
sliding in WBs. In this paper the backsliding of democracy can be 
understood as a dependent variable which cannot be measured either 
easily or directly. It is a dependent variable which is contextualized, 
namely it is taken to be a rough approximation of the deteriorating 
levels of of perceived corruption, political participation and political 
freedom, shown in the three aforementioned Tables and the qualitative 
information provided in the immediately previous sections of the pa-
per. The paper’s next sections offer an interpretation of this phenome-
non. 
V. Existing approaches to the lack of democratic consolidation 
in Western Balkans  
There already exists valuable research on classifying WB democracies 
and unearthing their major problems, as seen in the light of the model 
of liberal democracies. In an effort to understand why, even after 
democratic consolidation has been accomplished, liberal democracy in 
WB continues to function at sub-standard levels, various concepts 
have already been coined for the analysis of democracy in some East 
European countries. Such concepts, useful also for the study of WBs, 
are “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997), “defective democracy” 
(Merkel 2004), the “the quality of democracy” (Diamond and Morlino 
2005, Morlino 2011, Roberts 2014) and “de-democratization” (Tilly 
2007).  
All these conceptual innovations have tried to illuminate the glaring 
gap between formal and substantive democracy in Eastern Europe 
(Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002) and are useful to understand the contem-
porary WBs too. 
Different conceptualizations of the sub-standard performance of WB 
democracies have been accompanied by attempts to actually measure 
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such performance. For instance, the opinions of the general public in 
the region and opinions of experts on the region have been registered.  
Examples of public opinion surveys include the Gallup Poll’s “Balkan 
Monitor” and the recent inclusion of population samples from Croatia 
and FYR Macedonia in the Standard Eurobarometer surveys, conduct-
ed by EU’s Eurostat service. Examples of expert surveys include the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s “Sustainable Governance Indicators” (SGI), 
the World Bank’s “Governance Indicators” and the “Failed States’ 
Index”. 
The above conceptual and empirical quantitative approaches to defec-
tive or dysfunctioning democracy in Eastern Europe have contributed 
a lot to the comparative political analysis of new democracies. Yet, 
the aforementioned approaches may run into two obstacles.  
First, there is a temptation to consider Western democracies to be pro-
totype models of liberal democracy, while this may not be so. As the 
performance of these democracies since 2008 has indicated in the con-
text of the global financial turmoil and the Eurozone crisis, they them-
selves have proven to be problematic.  
Indeed, as the Eurozone crisis since 2010 has shown, EU’s supra-
national democratic institutions (e.g., the European Parliament) and 
the EU’s Member-States usually take a back seat for as long as the 
management of the crisis lasts. Governments and even international 
non-elected officials, representing international financial institutions 
(IFIs), assume the task of steering national economies out of the crisis 
while citizens are expected to seat and watch. In advanced democra-
cies and particularly so EU democracies, participation in policy mak-
ing leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to reconciling the pres-
sures of international markets with the demands of democratic ac-
countability.  
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Even before the Eurozone crisis struck, the level of satisfaction of 
Europeans with the way democracy functioned in their countries var-
ied a lot and was generally on the decline (European Commission, 
Standard Eurobarometer time series data, 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Surv
ey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD).  
Thus, even Western democracies today encounter severe problems.  
Yet, compared to the admittedly imperfect yet existing and function-
ing liberal democracies of the West, WB democracies encounter com-
paratively more severe problems in a plethora of levels and instances 
mentioned in the next section of this paper. 
The second obstacle concerns the compilation of data, aiming to regis-
ter changes in quantitative variables over time. Such measurements, 
relying on indicators of defective democratization or quality of de-
mocracy, do not offer the full picture. They are very useful but they 
constitute only a starting base on which to construct, first, a descrip-
tion of the most crucial instances in which democracy continues to fail 
in WBs and, second, a set of linkages among these instances, suggest-
ing how they feed into each other.  
VI. Bending the rules of the democratic game without reaching 
a breaking point for democracy 
Even if one admits that democratic consolidation has been achieved in 
WBs, one should not be blind to recurring phenomena of divergence 
from standards of liberal democracy in the countries under study. To-
day in WBs governing elites seize or create opportunities to bend the 
rules of the democratic game to their own benefit. Examples are ma-
nipulating the electoral law, controlling the judiciary, using insider 
information or formulating policies to suit the acquisition of state-
owned assets by government-supported businessmen, and blocking 
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welfare state reforms which would have made social protection more 
evenly distributed across the population (Cohen and Lampe 2011, 
Balfour and Stratulat 2011, Bieber and Ristic 2012, Keil 2012). In 
other words, toying with the rules of party competition is a pattern 
distinguishing the VMRO-DMPNE governing elite in FYR Macedo-
nia, the SNS elite in Serbia and the DPS elite in Montenegro, as well 
as their predecessors in power (Bieber 2003, Ramet and Pavlakovic 
2005, Clark 2008, Bideleux and Jeffries 2008, Ramet 2010, Bo-
duszynski 2010).  
Bending the rules of the democratic game today, does not imply fla-
grant violation of the rules of such game, as was the case under semi-
authoritarian regimes in WBs of the 1990s and at least until the turn-
ing point of 1999-2001. This was a turning point for several WB 
countries. In FYR Macedonia, after long term tensions and the erup-
tion of armed conflict, a modus vivendi was established between the 
Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority through the Ohrid 
agreements of 2001. In former Yugoslavia, which at the time com-
prised both Serbia and Montenegro, the October 2000 revolution 
brought the downfall of the regime of Milosevic, while the passing 
away of Tudjman in 1999 allowed for the disassembling of the latter’s 
semi-authoritarian regime in Croatia. Essentially, this was the time 
point of real transition to democracy.  
Today’s governing elites do not reach the point of establishing a post-
authoritarian regime in the manner of Milosevic or Tudjman. Semi-
authoritarian legacies still survive in the WBs, particularly in the 
realms of citizen-administration relations and the secret services’ in-
volvement in national politics. Yet, pressures from international or-
ganizations, such as the European Commission or the Council of Eu-
rope, to streamline democracy in the WBs, the prevalent anti-
authoritarian “Zeitgeist”, and periodic, albeit not always effective, 
resistance on the part of some civic associations and NGOs do not 
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allow governing elites to pass a certain threshold of de-
democratization, beyond which even the bare essentials of liberal de-
mocracy would vanish. In the above context and under the noted pres-
sures, the aforementioned governing elites do not go all the way and 
abolish democracy.  
However, governing elites are capable to employ an array of means of 
political domination within a democratic context, i.e., within a regime 
characterized by elections, a multi-party system, and the exercise of 
basic, albeit periodically trimmed, political freedoms.  This range of 
means includes mismanaging and sidetracking the function of demo-
cratic institutions, such as the parliament; benefiting from ‘grey areas’ 
of political and economic interaction which have remained unregulat-
ed, such as, for example, public procurement; creating or exploiting 
loopholes in legislation to win disproportionate economic benefits; 
and getting away with all this, as control mechanisms which should 
have sanctioned such behaviour do not exist or are beforehand neutral-
ized by the very same interests which misuse democracy.  
Examples of lacking mechanisms are control mechanisms such as, for 
instance, independent regulatory authorities, an autonomous and 
skilled judiciary, and a professional civil service. Such mechanisms, if 
available, may have been able to check political party financing or 
unwarranted influence exerted by a businessman over a state agency 
in order to have an inquiry about corruption aborted or unbound activ-
ism of national secret services which often goes overboard. 
VII. The wider socio-economic context of democracy’s backslid-
ing in Western Balkans 
Naturally, one should put the behaviour of such governing elites and 
the noted absence of control mechanisms in a wider socio-economic 
context. Other types of elites and social groups should be factored in 
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the analysis of how and why democracy does not work in WBs today 
and why asymmetries of political power have become pervasive.  The 
wider context is an economic environment of unrestrained, if not wild, 
capitalism and also an ideological environment deplete of long-term 
political visions. 
The socio-economic context 
To start with, completely unrestrained national and local business in-
terests in conjunction with corruption-happy governing elites have a 
corrosive impact on WB democracies. In the first decades of the twen-
ty first century, capitalism may seem untamed in many parts of the 
world, but is clearly out of control in WBs. Owing to pressures from 
the EU (Elbasani 2013), the introduction of market regulation and 
regulatory authorities have only inched their way into the region’s 
capitalist economies. 
Yet, more importantly, at the same time business corporations from 
the wider region engulfing the WBs, i.e., from Germany, Italy, Austria 
and Greece, have early on established their own distinct beachheads in 
the post-socialist national markets of the Western Balkans. Then, cor-
porations gradually dominated whole sectors, such as banking and 
telecommunications. Foreign interests have benefited from and con-
tributed to the formation of the wild, almost completely unregulated 
variety of capitalism of the WBs (Bartlett 2007). 
To be sure, there is a corrosive impact of capitalism on the functioning 
of advanced democracies too. For instance, American democracy is 
disproportionately influenced by the size of donations of businessmen 
to potential candidates for the US presidency. Financial mishandling 
has also plagued the governing parties of major European democra-
cies, as the scandal over the finances of the Germany’s Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) party in the early 1990s clearly showed.  
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However, the type of capitalism predominating in WBs often allows 
the war of all against all, the devouring of whole business sectors by 
one business conglomerate and the moulding of labour relations at 
will, in the context of high unemployment rates, and flourishing black 
markets which state authorities just watch grow, incapable or reluctant 
to intervene. In other words, it is problematic to call the economies 
under study free market economies, as market institutions, such as 
banks and authorities overseeing commercial activities, often are un-
der government influence. Further on, private enterprises may be 
competing with large state-owned enterprises. In case of law viola-
tions private enterprises are not necessarily able to find protection by 
appealing to the rule of law, as law enforcing institutions are heavily 
influenced by the government too. In brief, the economic context is 
that of a heavily distorted type of capitalism, bounded by constraints 
put to it by a governing elite more certain about its own self-serving 
business plans than about plans for the economic development of its 
country. 
In this context, responsibilities for bending the rules of democratic 
game are not evenly distributed among different social actors. The 
latter include governing elites, business elites, relatively well-
protected insider groups, outsider groups and socially marginalized 
groups.  Certain elites and groups are far more powerful than other 
ones. This is particularly true for well-placed business elites, connect-
ed to governing elites, which win public tenders in the construction 
and energy sectors (e.g., in FYR Macedonia) or benefit from privati-
zations of state-owned assets (e.g., in the Montenegrin coast, on the 
Adriatic).  
Powerful elites are few and mostly recognizable, but power and re-
sources are not exclusively distributed among a few elites. In addition, 
certain groups, such as employees of state-owned enterprises or war 
veterans, enjoy access to a disproportionate share of resources. By 
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contrast, there are other groups, such as labour market outsiders and 
minorities, which are completely prevented from accessing even their 
fair share of economic and welfare resources. 
The ideological context 
Regarding the ideological context, in WBs there is a lack of home-
grown political vision of the future among political elites. Such vision, 
if it exists, is imported from abroad and consists of a repertoire of re-
peating the themes of Europeanization and modernization in a ritual-
like manner. Elites in WBs cannot fall back to (the by now defunct) 
state socialist ideology of the pre-1989 period.  
Governing elites in particular are pulled towards opposite directions. 
They are pulled, first, by pressures from below, often rekindled by 
mass media, to subscribe to nationalist, populist and anti-liberal pro-
jects and, second, by pressures by the EU and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) to adopt recognizable liberal democratic and pro-
market policies. Thus, WB elites stand at the crossroads of a forgetta-
ble past and an uncertain future of integration into the EU.  
The latter prospect has been harmed by the commitment of Jean-
Claude Junker, the President of the European Commission, to put Eu-
ropean enlargement on hold for at least five years (Juncker’s speech to 
the European Parliament, 14 July 2014). The integration of WBs into 
the EU has also been damaged by the propensity of WB governing 
elites to oscillate between embarking on the road to Europe and alight-
ing from EU’s slowly moving carriage at unpredictable stops. For ex-
ample, in their publicly expressed opinions, WB elites span the whole 
range from xenophobic, nationalist and populist discourse all the way 
to pro-EU rhetoric.  
Typical examples are, first, the shift of a foremost nationalist Serb 
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politician and former cadre of the Milosevic regime, Tomislav Ni-
kolic, to a pro-EU stance after splitting from the ultra-nationalist Serb 
Radical Party and launching his Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008. This 
was a pro-European shift which was later curbed by the SNS govern-
ment’s repeated overtures to the Russian President Putin at moments 
of tension between Russia and the EU in 2014-2015. A second exam-
ple is the incorporation of aspects of the nationalist agenda in the elec-
toral campaigns of Sali Berishsa (Democratic Party) and Edi Rama 
(Socialist Party) in the Albanian parliamentary elections of 2013.  
The protagonist’s role which unreconstructed populists/nationalists 
still have in WB domestic politics, such as Milorad Dodik in Repub-
lika Srpska, Arben Kurti in Kosovo and Nikola Gruevski in FYR 
Macedonia, is telling of a wider tendency setting WB democracies 
apart from the rest of European democracies.  
Admittedly populism has started becoming a pan-European phenome-
non (Kriesi and Pappas 2016). Moreover, elites of EU Member-States 
manage economic problems in a disturbing and problematic fashion, 
by mixing large doses of neoliberalism with what is left of a skeletal 
European Social Model. European elites also mishandle human rights 
and security issues, as they are unable to strike a balance between 
cosmopolitanism and defensive measures against refugees and immi-
grants or a balance between freedoms and counter-terrorism. Yet, 
among the elites of WB democracies there is an even more problemat-
ic situation, reflected in these elites’ resorting to worn-out ideologies 
(e.g., nationalism, populism); lacking of political vision how to steer 
their countries; and capturing policy sectors with the help of favoured 
businessmen.   
In sum, it is not enough for an analysis of democratic regimes in WBs 
to pinpoint the unsatisfactory performance of democracy in abstract 
terms or even to accurately measure pathologies, such as corruption, 
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organized crime, or restrictions in freedom of expression. One needs 
to become more specific about how and why the quality of democracy 
deteriorates in WBs, in the aforementioned socio-economic and ideo-
logical context.   
Among various means which practitioners of democratic backsliding 
use today, three stand out, namely, clientelism, populism, and corrup-
tion.   
VIII. An inventory of clientelist, populist and corruption-based 
means of political domination in today’s Western Balkans 
(WBs) 
One has to use a multi-focused analytical lens in order to explore the 
variable instances in which WB democracies fail or back slide.  A first 
step towards this direction would be to construct an inventory of 
populist, clientelist and corrupt practices of elites in WBs and indicate 
possible ways in which they are interconnected.  
In this section of the paper, such interconnected aspects are discussed 
in a sequence that may contribute to the understanding of how one 
problem leads to another. Causal connections and the flow of the ar-
gument emerge, as one goes from the first to the seventh (and last) of 
the following aspects.   
First, the phenomenon of policy capture (Hellman, Jones and Kauf-
mann 2000, Ganev 2007) is understood here as an aspect of political 
clientelism and rampant corruption too. Governing elites distribute 
spoils, such as lucrative niches of a certain market sector, to preferred 
businessmen, and, separately, also hand out social transfers to fa-
voured population groups. Albeit present also in advanced democra-
cies, policy capture has assumed immense proportions in WBs, to the 
point that it appears natural and unavoidable. Thus, in the WBs the 
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mass media sector is controlled by private media owners as well as 
governments; the energy sector is controlled by national and foreign 
business interests as well as governments (family members or busi-
ness  associates of government ministers); environmental policies are 
deflected by environment-polluting industrial interests; and social in-
surance and pension policies are heavily influenced by insiders of the 
labour market and selected relatively privileged groups, such as war 
veterans in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Second, policy capture is directly related to the obvious imbalance of 
powers in WB democracies. This imbalance is a typical characteristic 
of populism in power, i.e., of the way populists rule after winning 
elections. While since the early 20th century there has been in all ad-
vanced democracies a discernible tendency of the “executive branch 
of government” to overshadow the other two “branches”, namely the 
legislative and the judicial, in WBs there is a much more pronounced 
relative degradation of the legislature vis-à-vis the government and a 
discernible subservience of the judiciary to the changing wishes of the 
government. The government-of-the-day functions almost uncon-
trolled by the parliament and the justice system. 
The disproportionate strengthening of the government, which has al-
most permanently upset the required balance with the legislature and 
the judiciary, is probably related to two types of pressures which set 
WB democracies apart from the rest of European democracies: first, 
periodic challenges to national sovereignty (Post-Dayton Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia’s strained and then disconnected cohabitation 
with Montenegro and Kosovo, ethnic conflict in FYR Macedonia); 
and, second, repeated deep economic crises, sometimes related to un-
resolved national sovereignty issues and to the spilling over into the 
Balkans of international economic setbacks (e.g., the global financial 
crisis which has affected the region since 2008).   
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Third, the nearly unchallenged dominance which the government ex-
erts over the judiciary and the legislature in WB is facilitated by 
anaemic political participation from below. This is another manifesta-
tion of the way populism structures state-society relations, once popu-
lism acquires political power: populists never favour political partici-
pation from below, unless they can control it. Thus, for populists an 
independent civil society is an unwanted challenge which should be 
kept at bay.  
Of course, the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe after 1989 
(Howard 2003) and in particular in WBs has not been the result of 
populism. Civil society may have become weaker over time in ad-
vanced democracies, but it has never taken off the ground in WBs 
after transition to democracy and the end of wars, such as the War in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995).  
Fourth, populism has played an actively negative role in political par-
ticipation. The latter has over time become anaemic because the public 
sphere has proven sterile and dominated by large business interests 
combined by government-engineered restrictions in mass media plu-
ralism. The press and electronic media are owned by moguls closely 
associated with successive governments. Moreover, today govern-
ments influence, if not fully control, the distribution of information 
and interpretation of political and economic events. Governments 
achieve this by opening and closing the taps of state funds which are 
to be channelled to cash-starved mass media. A principle mechanism 
through which governments accomplish such control is the selective 
placement of advertisements of policy measures of government and 
services or goods of state owned enterprises in selected media outlets.    
Fifth, populism adopts and enforces a particular strategy towards forc-
es of political opposition, such as political parties not participating in 
populist-led coalition governments. Given the aforementioned weak-
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ness of civil society and mass media opposition to state authorities, it 
is no surprise that parliamentary opposition to elected governments is 
generally weak in Western Balkans. Opposition parties are rarely ca-
pable of effectively checking on the government through parliamen-
tary control over the government’s deeds.  
Further on, opposition parties rarely mount considerable pressure on 
the government through typical and atypical political participation 
means, such as mass rallies and strikes. The rallies organized by the 
Socialist Party against the Berisha government in 2009-2011 in Alba-
nia, by the SNS party against the DS-led government of Boris Tadic in 
2010-2011 in Serbia or by the Vetevedosje movement (and later on 
the political party by the same name) in Kosovo are notable and cov-
ered by the media because they are an exception, not the rule.  
One would expect that the weakness of opposition is the result of elec-
toral systems, favouring the formation of strong single-party govern-
ments. However, in most WB democracies, coalition rather than sin-
gle-party majority governments are in place. Electoral systems are 
variations of proportional representation (PR) which would normally 
facilitate the participation of multiple parties in parliament, opposing 
the government.   
Parliamentary opposition is weak, not because of the type of electoral 
system, but because of the marginalization of civil society. Excluding 
humanitarian NGOs, often supported by foreign sponsors, civil society 
organizations have all but been suffocated by governing elites. There 
is a very thin layer of such organizations able to mobilize against state 
authorities, particularly in Serbia and Montenengro, while there is 
some dynamism in this sector in FYR Macedonia, as protests against 
the Gruevski government in 2015 showed.  The parliamentary opposi-
tion’s weakness is also owed to the lack of a clear political agenda 
which would be alternative to the agenda of governing parties.  
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Further on, opposition parties suffer from the problems evident in all 
political parties of post-communist WBs. Researching opposition par-
ties in WBs, one stumbles upon a personalist type of party organiza-
tion, enhancing the discriminatory power of the party leader over par-
ty organs and diminishing the chances to draw on collective resources 
(e.g., local party organizations) and on technical expertise. Moreover, 
there is low trust of citizens in political parties in general (Pasos pro-
ject 2016), as there is a widespread conception of politicians as com-
pletely untrustworthy. One cannot avoid the impression that in WBs 
certain opposition leaders, upon coming to power, easily slide into 
similar shady practices as their predecessors. 
Sixth, populism can be blamed for imposing a strict diet on democra-
cy, exactly because it is in the nature of populism to distrust and to try 
to marginalize political institutions and democratic processes other 
than elections, in a word to suppress pluralism (Muller 2016). In con-
junction with the opposition’s frequent inability to resist government 
initiatives, democracy is often limited to formalities, i.e., to provide a 
rubber stub of government decisions. Today, in all advanced democ-
racies, including those of EU Member-States, there is a disconcerting 
gap between formal and substantive democracy, i.e., between estab-
lishing the rules of democratic game and keeping them. There is also a 
gap between acknowledging democratic values, such as freedom of 
expression and tolerance, and truly adhering to them.  
Yet, in WB democracies one encounters a far more serious gap. This 
is in fact an abysmal gap between the surface and substance of demo-
cratic life. The gap is mostly owed to the unrestrained authority exer-
cised by governing elites and the untamed influence of business elites, 
mentioned in the first item of this inventory.  
Democratic institutions, such as regulatory authorities independent of 
the government, are imported from abroad but are actually ignored. 
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An example is the Berisha government’s indifference, if not hostility, 
towards the proper functioning of the Elections Committee in the Al-
banian national elections of 2013. Moreover, governments change the 
rules according to which appointments to the judiciary are made. For 
instance, in Serbia the coalition government led by the Democratic 
Party dismissed all Serbian judges in 2007 and selected their replace-
ments, but later on, in 2013-2014, the coalition government led by the 
Progressive Party (SNS) re-instated the formerly dismissed judges.  
What is more, governments of the region, pressed by the international 
community, have recently engaged in a fight against corruption which, 
regardless of its sincerity and efficiency, allows for enhancing the 
government’s image and redistributing the spoils of power. Relevant 
examples are the long process of prosecuting since 2012 of Miroslav 
Miskovic and Milan Beko, two businessmen in Serbia who had forged 
links with governments preceding the Vucic government, and the im-
prisonment in September 2016 in Montenegro of Svetozar Marovic, 
the former President of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (the last 
Yugoslav state). No one would claim that WB governments should 
refrain from anti-corruption, but their anti-corruption campaigns 
should be seen in the light of a long chain of distorted uses of demo-
cratic institutions and processes.   
Seventh, the hostility of practitioners of populism and corruption to-
wards rule of law is a well-known (Dolenec 2013). This is a point one 
does not need to dwell for long, although it should be argued that the 
unsatisfactory level of rule of law is the outcome, not the cause, of 
democracy’s backsliding. Indeed, there is no clearer indication of the 
very large gap between formal adherence to democratic principles and 
actual betrayal of them and no stronger evidence of the frequent cap-
ture of whole policy sectors and the corrosive impact of untamed capi-
talism on democracy than the deplorable state of rule of law in WB 
democracies. In WBs the justice system may be manipulated from 
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above; law enforcement agencies are weak or corrupt; business oli-
garchs acquire a sense that they are untouchable by the legally compe-
tent authorities; and minorities and the powerless categories of the 
population (e.g., the unemployed) quickly realize that they cannot 
resort to state authorities to rectify the injustices and discrimination 
they suffer in social relations and the labour market.   
What is the result of the above mentioned seven patterns on the de-
mocracy and the state in WBs? It can be deduced from the patterns of 
this inventory that the state in WBs is very weak. The combined ef-
fects of clientelism, populism and corruption have brought whatever 
state capacity had been available to its knees. In order for democracy 
to grow, clearly demarcated and largely undisputed national borders, a 
predictable institutional environment and a minimum of administra-
tive capacity are necessary. Above all, while there is an increasing 
trend towards the politicization of public bureaucracies around the 
world (Peters and Pierre 2004), still a minimum of bureaucratic au-
tonomy from political authority is expected and required in contempo-
rary democracies.  
These conditions are not met in the WBs. For example, in the cases of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia issues related to 
borders and national sovereignty are still open. Moreover, in these and 
the rest of countries of WBs, civil servants lack the skills to administer 
economy and society, while state institutions do not function in pre-
dictable manner.  
State officials cannot regulate or control the market, provide a reason-
ably level-playing field for market competition, inspect and intervene 
in labour relations, push organized crime back, restrict the black econ-
omy, tax the population and business firms and provide a minimum 
level of social protection to all.  
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Strengthening state capacity has been a frequent, if somewhat sub-
dued, aim of post-conflict international initiatives in the region, for 
example EU’s CARDS program in the early 2000s or EU’s Instrument 
of Pre-Accession (IPA) program in the current decade. Yet, it seems 
that state officials and leading politicians themselves often have as 
their top priority to find their own preferred business partners in the 
private sector and enrich themselves. Enhancing state capacity and 
balancing (instead of misusing) democratic institutions are tasks in 
which they are least interested. 
IX. Sorting out the causes of democracy’s backsliding in West-
ern Balkans  
Violations of rule of law, spread of organized crime, state weakness 
and other such phenomena obviously do not happen by themselves. 
Somebody engages in law violation, organized crime and neglects the 
affairs of the state. The observed imbalance of powers in WB democ-
racy and the wild, untampered manner in which capitalism works in 
the region obviously require a long-time misuse of institutions by 
those who benefit from the malfunctioning of democracy and the mar-
ket.  
In other words, in analytical terms, the study of agency has to take 
precedence over the study of structure. In politics, while structures 
constrain the actors’ room from maneuver, eventually it is people act-
ing upon structures and producing ills, for example, weak public ad-
ministrations and malfunctioning justice systems. 
If one is called upon to prioritize some of the aspects mentioned in the 
above analysis, one should start from the collective actors, business 
elites and governing elites, who are unwilling or unable to reform the 
problematic situations noted above. Besides elites, additional collec-
tive actors, who have carved out their own protected niches in the 
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stormy economic conditions prevailing in WB capitalism, are groups 
of public sector workers, pensioners, war veterans, and others.  
Such occupational groups, consisting of labour market and welfare 
state “insiders”, may be not the same ones in all WB democracies, but 
benefit from similar situations within each WB country. In a nutshell, 
they benefit from preferential treatment by state authorities and ne-
glect for ”outsiders”, including the unemployed, women and the 
young as well as ethnic and religious minorities; and, as argued in the 
main body of this paper, selected privileged elites and occupational 
groups benefit from the lack of adequate control mechanisms.  
Moreover, no other vision seems to prevail among elites except for the 
business elites’ vision of securing a sizeable share of the market and 
quick and unrestrained profit-making; and the political elites’ vision 
of hanging on to power by subscribing to an ideological mix of popu-
lism and nationalism.   
The business elites’ interests in preserving and enlarging their market 
share and expanding their profits, on the one hand, and the governing 
elites’ interest in holding on to power, possibly personally enriching 
themselves along the way, on the other hand, are the ties that bind WB 
democracies to the ground, never allowing them to take off to higher 
levels of performance. 
X. How populism, clientelism, corruption and anti-corruption 
feed into each other 
The conditions under which the three explanatory mechanisms, name-
ly populism, clientelism and corruption, evolve in order to produce a 
backsliding of democracy differ from country to country. It would 
take a much larger historical and conjunctural analysis of the three 
countries under study in order to specify how each of the three mech-
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anisms actually work. Thus, in what follows, only a tentative sketch of 
interactions among the three mechanisms is presented.  
Governing elites and their social and economic allies do not necessari-
ly plan all the above strategies ahead of time nor do they execute their 
plans impeccably. Otherwise, they would not have faced even the un-
even political opposition which has periodically challenged their pow-
er, such as for instance the strong antigovernment protests in Monte-
negro in October 2015 and in FYR Macedonia in the spring of 2015 
and in June 2016. While one cannot speak of a system, linking popu-
lism, clientelism and corruption together as means of political domina-
tion, there are many ways in which these three means, which result 
into the backsliding of democracy, feed into each other. 
To start with, the clientelist appointments of pro-government person-
nel to higher- and middle-ranking positions in the central public ad-
ministration and state-owned enterprises contribute to implementation 
of populist policies. Such policies usually favour selected categories 
of the population and social groups which are not necessarily the 
poorest ones, but are probably the most loyal to the government in 
terms of their electoral support. Examples of such groups are employ-
ees of state-owned enterprises, war veterans and pensioners. Clien-
telism in the aforementioned quarters of the state apparatus is key to 
pursuing policies which may be inefficient and irrational, but are ben-
eficial to governing elites in terms of electoral returns. 
Clientelistic appointments by the government to entry-level jobs in the 
public sector may serve as an indication that the governing elites care 
for their pool of voters, particularly if the aforementioned implementa-
tion of populist policies and the hiring of party supporters to the public 
sector are couched in an anti-elitist political discourse. 
The combination of distributing favours through populist policies and 
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recruitment of supporters to the public sector serves to tie voters to the 
government in between elections, a strategy useful if the government 
counts on popular support in order to restrict pluralism in the media 
sector, a favourite target of populist elites (e.g. in FYR Macedonia), or 
to undermine independent authorities, such as the Ombudsman or the 
Personal Data Protection Authority (e.g., in Serbia). The purpose of 
such a strategy is to decrease any controls on the government, i.e. to 
block channels of democratic accountability. 
The same holds when governing elites need popular support in order 
to start anti-corruption campaigns, targeted against business people 
who had collaborated with the previous government or against politi-
cians of the opposition or cadres of NGOs, as it has happened in FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
The strategy to restrict pluralism in the media and to undermine inde-
pendent administrative and regulatory authorities tails with the pro-
pensity of governing elites in the countries under study to tamper with 
the rules of public procurement in order to award the construction of 
public works and other projects to their favoured businessmen. If me-
dia are few or weak and independent authorities are neutralized, the 
nexus between governing and business elites can grow and its mem-
bers prosper. 
The same strategy can facilitate the passage of legislation in parlia-
mentary committees and the plenum of the parliament, after control 
mechanisms are decreased or discredited. Such a lowering of account-
ability mechanisms proves useful when the government-of-the-day 
opts to channel state subsidies to favoured occupational groups or to 
grant loans through state-controlled banks to preferred business 
groups. 
In sum, the free and not necessarily fully planned combination of 
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strategies of populism, clientelism and corruption gradually trans-
forms the democratically elected government into a near-regime. This 
may not be a regime of competitive authoritarianism of the sort en-
countered in former Soviet republics (Levitsky and Way 2010), as the 
possibility of government overturn through elections still exists. It is 
however a regime which approximates that model without resorting to 
blatant oppression.   
Obviously, the three patterns of political domination do not feed into 
each other in the same way. There are differences in the way popu-
lism, clientelism and corruption impact on FYR Macedonia, Monte-
negro and Serbia. 
To start with, in Serbia there is more political apathy than Montenegro 
or FYR Madeconia. Then, one has to take into account the small scale 
in Montengro (population 621,000). In this context, where almost eve-
ryone personally knows or has met everyone, it is difficult to built 
bias-proof democratic institutions and meritocratic processes.  
On a different vein, as it is well-known, democratic institutions and 
meritocratic processes do not easily adapt to ethnically-segmented 
societies, particularly where ethnic conflict is recurrent and acute, as 
in FYR Macedonia.  This is a context obviously different from that of 
Montenegro and Serbia, where existing ethnic differences have not 
threatened the very bases of the democratic regime. In other words, 
national sovereignty has not been a divisive issue and a recurring 
theme in the domestic politics of Montenegro (at least after 2006), as 
it has been in FYR Macedonia. And Serbian ethnic problems refer 
mostly to challenges to Serbian borders rather than the domestic mix 
and interaction of the Serbian majority and small ethnic minorities 
residing in Serbia. 
On the other hand, populist governments reign supreme in FYR Mac-
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edonia (roughly since 2006) and Serbia (since 2012). By contrast, 
populism is not the primary means of political domination in Monte-
negro, where one sees rampant populism among parties of the opposi-
tion, for example, parties forming the coalition “Democratic Front”, 
which finished in the second place in the parliamentary elections of 
2016. 
Further research is necessary in order to substantiate the differing ba-
ses or means of political domination in the three countries under 
study. For the time being, it can only be stated in the form of three 
varying research hypotheses that the bases of power in Serbia, are 
related to populism, clientelism and corruption; in FYR Macedonia, to 
populism and corruption; and in Montenegro, to clientelism and cor-
ruption. 
XI. Conclusions: Putting the pieces of the puzzle together 
The flow of this paper’s argument is the following: business elites 
have orchestrated and governing elites have tolerated the capture of 
public policy sectors by business conglomerates. The reverse also may 
hold true, namely, governing elites orchestrating the capture of policy 
sectors through forging alliances with selected businessmen. This has 
been accomplished by creating a set of deficient democratic institu-
tions and adapting them over time to changing international and do-
mestic circumstances. The same holds for policy capture by relatively 
privileged occupational groups of insiders, which of course have few-
er assets and lower incomes than business groups.  
On their way up to enrichment and reproduction of privileged status, 
elites and occupational groups do not encounter any obstacles usually 
found in other European democracies. Typically, such pro-democratic 
obstacles are a series of control mechanisms, including the parliament 
and the judiciary, civil society, the press and mass media and a public 
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bureaucracy functioning with a minimum of administrative skill and 
autonomy from the government. 
In brief, policy capture would not have been possible without first 
achieving and consolidating the supremacy of the government over 
the other two powers, namely the legislature and the judiciary. This 
vital for contemporary democracies balance of powers has been de-
stroyed in WBs probably to an extent larger than in other European 
democracies. This imbalance cannot be easily rectified, as civil society 
and parliamentary opposition remain weak, while media pluralism is 
restricted in WB democracies. 
The combination of the strength of governing and business elites, ca-
pable of misusing democratic institutions, on the one hand, with the 
weakness of civil society and parliamentary opposition as well as re-
strictions on the media, on the other hand, depress the level of quality 
of democracy and negatively affect state capacities. How weak the 
latter are is obvious in the misapplication of legislated policy 
measures, the policy implementation gap, unpredictable law enforce-
ment, uneven application of rule of law, and the spread of corruption.  
All this amounts to a larger than usual gap between formal and sub-
stantive democracy, which albeit known in other democracies, is 
clearly most obvious in WB democracies.  
This gap may take a long time to close. Defending democracy, which 
is currently slipping away or has already slipped away from WB coun-
tries, would require both domestic mobilization of pro-democratic 
forces of civil society and any pro-democratic segments of each coun-
try's elites, and international pressure and support, couched in some 
form of external conditionality, more successful than the current EU’s 
conditionality (Elbasani 2013).  
To sum up, democracy is defective and its quality low in WBs primar-
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ily because of the uses, i.e., the misuses, to which collective actors, 
namely business and governing elites and groups of insiders, have put 
democratic institutions. In fact, what has prevailed over time is a rep-
ertoire of combinations of clientelism, populism and corruption, which 
this paper has attempted to highlight and interpret. Democracy can 
still defend itself, but it cannot do it alone. 
A parallel, long term political endeavour, “from below” and “from 
above”, would be required for democracy in the Western Balkans to 
stand any chance to defend itself: first, a concerted effort to strengthen 
the pro-democratic forces in the arena of civil society; and, second,  
the formation of a group of pro-democratic reformers,  among politi-
cal, administrative and mass  media elites, who would be   determined 
to fight for re-balancing democratic institutions  in the affected coun-
tries and for establishing a minimum of transparency and accountabil-
ity, which are presently lacking. 
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